The apparently simple question, ‘Does philosophy of education have a future?’, is without a simple answer. Like so many other questions, it all depends on what we mean, and in this case, what we mean by the expression ‘philosophy of education’. I shall look at it in all of three ways: as a social institution, as an academic activity and as an intellectual pursuit. By doing so, it will become evident that consideration of each of them in turn will give (...) somewhat different answers, which not only adds to the complexity of the question, but also adds to the richness of the answer. From this we, as individuals and as members of a particular community, can begin to reflect on the sort of future philosophy of education might have and what, if anything, we ought to do about it. (shrink)

Social justice is a key concept in current education policy and practice. It is, however, a problematic one in its application to schooling. This paper begins with a critique of the account of social justice offered by Gewirtz followed by an alternative philosophical notion based on the perfect world argument and the just society where equality is to the fore. This leads on to an exploration of what it is to be an educated citizen, consideration of the just school and (...) discussion of the place of the school as an instrument for attaining social justice. The conclusion draws attention to the importance of the policy web as a way of developing coherent and unified policy designed to achieve social justice for all. (shrink)

In 1964, Richard Peters examined the place of philosophy in the training of teachers. He considered three things: Why should philosophy of education be included in the training of teachers; What portion of philosophy of education should be included; How should philosophy be taught to those training to be teachers. This article explores the context of the time when Peters set out his views, describes philosophy of education at the London Institute of Education at one period in Peters? time there, (...) and then discusses the current state of philosophy of education, using New Zealand as an example of opportunities and challenges. Finally, asking whether Peters was nearly right about the place of philosophy in the training of teachers, it is concluded that he was right about its importance but got it wrong about his conception of philosophy. (shrink)

Postmodernism has established a significant hold in educational thought and some of the most important ideas are to be found in the writings of Michael Peters. This paper examines his postmodern stance and use of Lyotard's account of knowledge, and from a naturalist point of view raises a number of objections centred on science as a metanarrative, the unity of the empirical and the evaluative, and reason, truth and the growth of knowledge. It is concluded that postmodern epistemology, unlike naturalism, (...) does not serve education well. (shrink)

Postmodernism has established a significant hold in educational thought and some of the most important ideas are to be found in the writings of Michael Peters. This paper examines his postmodern stance and use of Lyotard's account of knowledge, and from a naturalist point of view raises a number of objections centred on science as a metanarrative, the unity of the empirical and the evaluative, and reason, truth and the growth of knowledge. It is concluded that postmodern epistemology, unlike naturalism, (...) does not serve education well. (shrink)

The report on educational research, commissioned by the Office for Standards in Education, written by James Tooley with assistance, and published under the title Educational Research: a critique, set out to ‘help provide some badly needed evidence to inform the debate about the quality of educational research’ . Whether this ‘snapshot’ actually upholds Hargreaves' contention that there is a considerable amount of ‘second rate educational research’ is far from clear, although Tooley does conclude that the majority of studies surveyed lacked (...) a clear focus, employed sloppy methodology and displayed partisanship. Now, those whose work was critiqued might, with some justification, grumble about Tooley's own ideological bias given his well‐known right‐wing, market‐oriented views about education. Concern could also be directed at the report's methodological inadequacies, including the procedures adopted to select the journal sample, the categories employed for analysis, and the validity of the conclusions reached. I leave all of these for others to address. Rather, I shall examine two basic distinctions which Tooley adopts and deems important for his investigation into the state of educational research in Britain. The first is between empirical and non‐empirical research, the second is between quantitative and qualitative empirical research. Philosophically, both of these distinctions are highly problematic and as a philosopher Tooley should, at the very least, have acknowledged their contentiousness rather than simply taking them for granted. The purpose of this short note is to indicate why Tooley's reliance on these two distinctions will not do. (shrink)

The report on educational research, commissioned by the Office for Standards in Education, written by James Tooley with assistance, and published under the title Educational Research: a critique, set out to ‘help provide some badly needed evidence to inform the debate about the quality of educational research’. Whether this ‘snapshot’ actually upholds Hargreaves' contention that there is a considerable amount of ‘second rate educational research’ is far from clear, although Tooley does conclude that the majority of studies surveyed lacked a (...) clear focus, employed sloppy methodology and displayed partisanship. Now, those whose work was critiqued might, with some justification, grumble about Tooley's own ideological bias given his well‐known right‐wing, market‐oriented views about education. Concern could also be directed at the report's methodological inadequacies, including the procedures adopted to select the journal sample, the categories employed for analysis, and the validity of the conclusions reached. I leave all of these for others to address. Rather, I shall examine two basic distinctions which Tooley adopts and deems important for his investigation into the state of educational research in Britain. The first is between empirical and non‐empirical research, the second is between quantitative and qualitative empirical research. Philosophically, both of these distinctions are highly problematic and as a philosopher Tooley should, at the very least, have acknowledged their contentiousness rather than simply taking them for granted. The purpose of this short note is to indicate why Tooley's reliance on these two distinctions will not do. (shrink)